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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE 0? UTAH 
ROCK MANOR TRUST, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
STATE ROAD COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Case No. 143^2 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
Plaintiff is the owner of a sign and structure situated 
easterly from the frontage road abutting Interstate 15 in the 
vicinity of Farmington, Utah. The sign was a lawful nonconform-
ing use at the time of a fire which damaged the supporting 
structure. Defendant ordered removal of the renovated sign. 
1 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The lower court sustained the desicion of the defendant 
commission, first by memorandum decision stating: 
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TTThe court having heretofore taken this matter 
under advisement, rules that the sign is a 
rebuilt sign and must come downTT. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the decision of the lower 
court and the defendant commission, sustaining the right of 
plaintiff to maintain the sign as a continuing nonconforming 
use. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
No additional testimony was adduced in the District 
Court and the matter was considered by the court upon the trans-
cript forwarded to the court by the defendant pursuant to the 
provisions of Title 27, Chapter 12, Section 1369, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953 as amended in 1971, which provides for a review 
by the court to determine from the records, exhibits and trans-
cripts forwarded if the commission1s decision is supported by 
substantial evidence. 
The facts were largely undisputed except as to the 
extent of damage caused by the fire. 
The sign in question is located about a mile south of 
Farmington, Utah, easterly from the 1-15 frontage road. The 
structure upon which the sign is located was constructed in 
trapezoidel shape by permit issued November 17, 1959, as a dual 
purpose building to serve as a barn and as a base for signs which 
applicant anticipated would be allowed by subsequent zoning amend-
ment. Davis County amended its ordinance in 1963 to allow 
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advertising signs in this agricultural zone and issued Permit 
No. 19^, July 12, 1965, after which signs were painted on the 
north, west and south sides of the structure (Transcript 40). 
The Utah Outdoor Advertising Act 27-12-136.1 et ff. became 
effective in May 1967, and thereafter the county zoning as to 
signs in this area became ineffective. In September 1972, 
(although the commission findings state that the fire occurred 
in September 1971 and a new building permit was issued in October 
1971, the evidence is undisputed that the year was 1972, Tr. 3 
and exhibits, and defendant's counsel acknowledges this error), 
the structure was damaged by fire but the extent of the damage 
was disputed. Mr. Smith for theState estimated two-thirds 
destruction (Tr. 22) but he admitted that he never saw the 
structure after the fire and before it was circumscribed by 
another face (Tr. 30-31); did not take the pictures offered in 
evidence nor crawl inside where the physical inspection could be 
made (Tr. 23); admitted that all the metal siding which was 
attached to the original structure is still on location except a 
little on the north side (Tr. 30); did not see or inspect the 
west side of the original structure (Tr. 30); and he could not 
tell as to the present state of the metal on the original structure 
as to whether it fell in or was pounded in to accommodate the new 
facing (Tr. 31). In contrast, there was testimony for the plaintiff 
that the fire caused the structure to lean at the southeast corner 
and more so at the northeast corner, but that the front west was 
intact (Tr. 41); that the original structure could have been 
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repaired by bracing but to make a better looking job it was 
decided to utilize new facing materials; that the metal on the 
old structure was pounded down to accommodate bracing the new 
structure; that at the present time the entire west front is 
still intact for inspection; and that the old structure was not 
removed in order to preserve the evidence (Tr. 42). 
The new structure was constructed in October 1972 and 
the sign matter placed thereon does not utilize as much space 
as the former sign (Tr. 44)• 
Formal Findings of Fact were signed by the court 
(R 29 and 30) which are as follows: 
Findings of Fact 
Trl. The subject sign belonging to the plaintiff, 
is located on the east side of Interstate Highway 1-15, 
visible to the traveling public at milepost 35$-7$ in 
Davis County, Utah. 
2. The original sign was in existence prior to 
the effective date of the Utah Outdoor Advertising Act 
as set forth in Chapter Twelve (12) Title Twenty-seven 
(27), Utah Session Laws of 1967. 
3. The original sign prior to September or 
October, 1970, enjoyed a nonconforming use status. 
4. Sometime in September or October of 1970, 
a fire substantially destroyed the original sign. 
5. The plaintiff applied to the local authority 
for permission to build a TTbarnn in October of 1970 
where the remains of the old burnt-out structure stood. 
6. The ?rbarnrr was rebuilt around the periphery 
of the remains of the old burnt-out structure, using 
some of the old structure for support. 
7. In May, 1971, the plaintiff painted the 
advertising copy of the current structure and was cited 
by the State pursuant to Section 27-12-136.9 for 
erecting and maintaining an illegal sign. 
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$. On a requested hearing by the plaintiff, 
the State Road Commission of Utah made and entered 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions and rendered its 
decision that the subject sign was and is illegal 
and that it must be removed within 30 days unless 
appeal be taken.TT 
The court in its Conclusions of Law stated in part: 
!T2. The nonconforming sign use ceased to exist 
at the time the original sign was substantially 
destroyed by fire in September or October of 1970.TT 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THERE WAS NO LAW ORREGULATION IN EXISTENCE AT THE 
TIME OF THE FIRE WHICH DECLARED THAT DAMAGE BY FIRE 
TERMINATES THE NONCONFORMING RIGHT TO THE SIGN AND 
THE RIGHT TO RECONSTRUCT SAME. 
Notice of violation was dated May S, 1973, hence we 
review the laws in existence prior thereto. 27-12-136.7, Utah 
Code Annotated as amended 1967, 1971, provides in the last 
paragraph thereof as follows: 
"Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this 
section, the commission shall issue permits and identi-
fication tags, upon application and payment of the 
requisite fee for any sign lawfully in existence on the 
day prior to the effective date of this act, and the 
permits shall thereafter be renewed for such period 
of time as is prescribed in Section 27-12-136.10 unless 
the structure is removed for improper maintenance as 
defined by commission regulation. Permits shall be 
obtained prior to the beginning of construction of any 
sign. Signs lawfully in place on the effective date 
of this act shall have permits." 
27-12-136.6 provides: 
nThe commission is hereby authorized to make and 
promulgate regulations to control the erection and 
maintenance of outdoor advertising signs, displays 
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and devices along the interstate and primary 
highway systems in conformance with this act 
and in conformity with the agreement ratified and 
approved by this actTT. 
27-12-136.3(10)B defines: 
TTThe word 'maintenancer means to repair, 
refurbish, repaint or otherwise keep an existing 
sign structure in a state suitable for use." 
On many occasions, as revealed by the transcript, 
plaintiff requested defendant to supply any regulations or laws 
which would justify their order of removal, but the only regula-
tion supplied was one issued after July 9, 1973, by the Federal 
Government indicating that the states are to establish criteria, 
and "exceptions may be made for the rebuilding or re-erecting 
signs which have been vandalized or subject to some other criminal 
or tortious act, if permitted by the state law and re-erected in 
kind", (Tr. Summation page 5)• Swenson vs. Salt Lake City, 
16 U2d 231, 39S P2d #79 (1965) held that a zoning ordinance must 
be pleaded and proved and is not subject to judicial notice and 
that a zoning ordinance does not operate retrospectively against 
existing nonconforming buildings or uses where vested rights are 
concerned. 
Apparently no state or Federal law, regulation or 
criteria existed prior to July 9, 1973, which would govern re-
erection of signs or termination of non-conforming uses. At the 
hearing reference was made to Davis County zoning ordinances over 
objections that they were not properly pleaded or proved, but the 
ordinance, Chapter 7, Section 7-6(2) supports the plaintiff, and 
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a copy of the relevant part thereof is in the record (R 26), and 
in substance it states that a nonconforming use may continue 
after destruction by fire if restoration is started within a 
period of one year and diligently pursued. The Findings state 
that the fire occurred in September or October 1970, but trans-
cript clearly shows the mistake in that it occurred in September 
1972 and counsel admitted this error before the court and is 
expected to admit this on appeal. A building permit issued 
October 11, 1972 and the sign was completed in May 1973-
An extensive annotation relative to repair of non-
conforming structures after damage or destruction by fire or 
other casualty is contained in 57 ALR 3rd 419 et ff. At page 
427 the text states: 
Tt
 . . . . although it is usually stated that a 
nonconforming structure or a structure devoted to a 
nonconforming use may be repaired or rebuilt after 
damage thereto or the destruction thereof by fire or 
other casualty, unless there is some restriction in 
the applicable zoning measure to the contrary. Thus, 
where such restriction is repealed, the effect of the 
repeal is to allow restoration of a damaged noncon-
forming structure". 
In the instant case no restriction on repair or 
rebuilding existed, and the reconstruction was proper. 
Also in Id ALR 2nd at page 754, it is stated that 
involuntary'destruction of the nonconforming use does not con-
stitute abandonment and the owner is entitled to replace the 
destroyed structure. 
Again in $7 ALR 2nd 104 it is stated: 
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TrIn absence of any prohibitory provision, a non-
conforming structure, or a structure devoted to a 
nonconforming use may be repaired or rebuilt after 
damage thereto or the destruction thereof by fire 
or other casualty". 
The State Road Commission is created by statute and 
can only exercise those powers granted by the legislature 
(Interwest Corp. vs. Public Service Commission, 29 U2nd 3$0, 
510 P2d 919) • There are no statutes authorizing the State Road 
Commission to define or delimit nonconforming uses, nor had the 
commission created any such regulation. 
POINT II. 
THIS COURT HAS RECOGNIZED THE COMPENSABLE PROPERTY 
RIGHTS AND THE RIGHT OF RELOCATION OF A NONCON-
FORMING SIGN. 
Related questions were decided by this court in 
National Advertising Co. vs. Utah State Road Commission, 26 U2d 
132, 4$6 P2d 3$3 (1971), where the company had an old sign near 
the freeway which could no longer be seen, and it discussed with 
the defendant the change of size, height, location and direction. 
A new permit was issued by the commission for the same size as 
the old sign, but the company erected a considerably larger sign 
35 feet north of the old sign and left both signs standing for 
about 60 days which caused friction with the commission representa-
tive who gave notice and ordered the new sign to be taken down. 
On appeal to the District Court, the commission was prohibited 
from removing the new sign. The trial court found that the 
company as lessee of the site had property rights and outdoor 
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advertising privileges on the property in question and that the 
new sign was a continuation of the existence of the outdoor 
advertising and property rights of the plaintiff with the knowledge, 
consent and permit of the commission. On appeal this court held 
there was believable evidence "that the plaintiff had established 
a nonconforming use of an advertising sign visible to the travel-
ing public at that location; that in order to continue its use 
effectively there had to be some substantial changes for which 
permission of the defendant was sought; that the changes were 
made substantially within the purview of the negotiations of the 
parties with either the consent or at least without serious 
objection from the Road Commission until the new sign was 
completely constructed; and there has been no procedure by the 
commission to remove the sign and pay just compensation therefor 
as provided in the Highway Beautification Act". 
The significant elements of the National Advertising 
case as it relates to the instant case are: 
(1) A nonconforming use was recognized as a compen-
sable property right. 
(2) There was voluntary removal of the old sign. 
(3) If the Road Commission had authority to allow a 
new sign, larger and in a new location, to be built to allow 
realistic use of the outdoor advertising rights of a noncon-
forming sign, in that case, then it has a duty to be similarly 
reasonable and realistic in allowing repair or reconstruction 
- 9 - ' • 
of an involuntarily damaged sign. 
(4) Compensable property rights exist apart from the 
physical sign in that this court held that National should be 
paid compensation for the removal of the new sign which rights 
stemmed from the old sign. 
POINT III. 
IT IS A DENIAL OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS TO DEPRIVE 
PLAINTIFF OF THE RIGHT TO MAINTAIN ITS SIGN WHERE NO 
LAW OF THE LAND DECLARED THE LOSS OF THE RIGHT BY 
INVOLUNTARY DESTRUCTION OF THE PHYSICAL SIGN. 
The concept of due process of law has a dual aspect, 
substantive and procedural, (16 AmJur 2nd 941)• 
In the instant case, the procedural due process has 
been recognized and largely followed. However, substantive due 
process has been ignored. As stated in 16 Am. Jur. 2nd 946: 
TTSubstantive due process may be roughly defined as 
the constitutional guaranty that no person shall 
be deprived of his life, liberty or property for 
arbitrary reasons* such a deprivation being con-
stitutionally supportable only if the conduct from 
which the deprivation flows is proscribed by 
reasonable legislation. . . reasonably applied . . .TT. 
No statutory law or other law existed as of the date of the fire 
which stated that a nonconforming use is lost by involuntary 
destruction as by loss through fire and the defendant is without 
authority to assume that the fire in fact terminated the non-
conforming use. Any action upon such assumption is arbitrary, 
unreasonable and an attempt to legislate and impose ex post facto 
regulations in violation of due process of law. 
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CONCLUSION 
In absence of any regulation prohibiting re-erection 
of the nonconforming sign after involuntary damage by fire, the 
Court should reverse the decision of the lower court and the 
defendant commission. 
Respectfully submitted, 
George K.'Fade! 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
170 West Fourth South 
Bountiful, Utah 3^010 
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